INTRODUCTION
In the wake of several high-profile failures of risk management (such as Barings Bank, Metallgesellschaft, and Orange County), there has been a widespread call for better quantification of the financial risks facing corporate and financial service firms. At the forefront of this clamor for a standardized risk measure has been Value at Risk, or VaR as it is commonly known. VaR is simply defined as the expected minimum loss of a portfolio over some time period for some level of probability. VaR's popularity is based on its ability to aggregate several components of firm wide market risk into a single number. Moreover, it focuses on a major concern of senior managers, the potential for significant loss in a firm's portfolio of assets. In its various forms, VaR has also gained strong support from industry and regulatory bodies such as the Group of Thirty (G30 1993), the Bank for International Settlements (Settlements 1994) , and the European Union.
1 Proponents of VaR believe it will replace or at least complement less standardized techniques such as Asset/Liability Management and Stress testing, and as a result, it is hoped that regulators, auditors, shareholders and management, will finally be speaking a common language with respect to risk.
A Brief Description Of The Study
But while the concept of VaR is straightforward, it's implementation is not. There are a variety of models and model implementations that produce very different estimates of the risk for the same portfolio. While previous studies have focused on how differences between models 2 cause variation in VaR, this study considers how differences in the implementations of the same model produce variation in VaR. These issues are critical for practitioners; divergence in models and implementations leads to uncertainty in the mind 1 The European Union's Capital Adequacy Directive makes the VaR of the market risk in a bank's trading book one input to the calculation of their capital reserve requirement. For banks in the Group of Ten countries, the Basle committee on Banking supervision is proposing allocating risk capital according to banks' internal VaR models. 2 In this paper, the term "model", denotes a system of postulates and data together with a means of drawing dynamic inferences from them. See for example, Derman (1996) .
of the end user as to the meaning of the VaR estimates. This uncertainty translates to the real risk that the VaR estimates are used inappropriate y. To understand the importance of this risk in the estimation of VaR, we developed a test portfolio (see Appendix), which was given to a number of leading risk management software vendors, all of whom advertised that they used the same model of risk, J.P. Morgan's RiskMetrics™, and obtained their estimates for the portfolio's VaR. The results were analyzed and are discussed below.
Previous Research
This work builds on earlier research describing different models of VaR most notably, Tanya Beder's (1995) comparison of simulation and parametric models of VaR, and more recently, Daryll Hendricks (1996) comparison of random foreign exchange portfolios using different VaR models over multiple dates. Beder applied eight different approaches to three hypothetical portfolios and found VaR results varying by a factor of 14. She explained this by noting VaR's extreme sensitivity to the modeler's choice of parameters, data, assumptions and methodology. Hendricks compared twelve value-at-risk models to 1,000 randomly chosen FX portfolios. Using nine criteria to evaluate model performance, he found less variance than did Beder, noting that the different models generally capture the risk that they set out to assess and tend to produce risk estimates that are similar in average size. Our study differs from the previous research in two critical respects; first, our intent is not to compare different models, rather to understand the importance of the real world implementation and use of just one of these models. Secondly, our study focuses on different commercially available systems used by different individuals rather than specially constructed test systems used by the same individual. We suggest that this makes for a more realistic test of the use and interpretation of systems' results.
Models of VaR and Systems Risk
There are a variety of models that may be used to estimate Value at Risk. For instance, some risk management systems allow user-defined simulations, or use scenario-based models to calculate VaR. These techniques, and the circumstances in which they, and the tools that implement them, are most appropriate, are described elsewhere, e.g., Leong (1996) . However, the most widely used technique to calculate VaR utilizes historical covariances between different risk factors to assess the effect of shocks on a portfolio whose positions can be mapped to those risk factors.
3 One such parametric model is J.P.
Morgan's RiskMetrics™, and given its widespread use, we believe it is timely to ask to what extent this particular model provides a lingua franca for risk measurement.
Updated daily across the Internet 4 , RiskMetrics™ correlations and volatilities allow users to assess their aggregate financial market risks (in terms of VaR) over a given time period consistently across different asset classes. And, in an effort to make the use of the datasets more transparent, J.P. Morgan have also made public the detailed model by which these volatilities and correlations are calculated and the manner in which they should be used (Guldimann 1995) . While this model has been criticized as making overly simplistic assumptions, we note that models are invariably compromises between usability on the one hand and accuracy on the other; RiskMetrics™ focuses on providing a relatively simple and transparent tool (Longerstaey and Zangari 1995 senior management, is often not a specialist in financial models and systems, and therefore tends to take the outputs from the models and systems at face value, partially oblivious of Model Risk and almost totally unaware of Systems Risk.
Research Goals
These goals are four-fold:
. To assess the variance in VaR estimates produced by different commercial implementations of the same model of Value at Risk.
. To assess how such variance is dependent on the nature of the asset class,
. To compare these results with the prior expectations of the vendors and those of the researchers, based on the portfolio's structure.
. Finally, to understand the extent of Systems Risk in the provision of any potential standard for risk measurement.
9 Note: That different model and system developers make different assumptions does not imply that they are in error. Rather, it should be inferred that an assumption's "correctness" is really an evolving social
RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Participants
As of the initial date of this study, twenty two vendors were known to have incorporated 
Research Process
The extensive test portfolio is summarized in the appendix and was designed to assess the capabilities of all the tools and to produce a fair, but comprehensive and realistic test of their VaR capabilities, We also produced instructions describing the appropriate parameterizations to be used for the test. When the VaR estimates were returned, they were compared and analyzed, and feedback given to the vendors regarding any major discrepancies. 10 In many cases, vendors explained their need to change their results; the new results and the explanations for the changes were incorporated into the final report.
When a sufficient number of results were gathered, they were analyzed on a case by case basis and also in terms of several prior hypotheses. A complete analysis was given to vendors describing all the results and made public in summary articles such as this. To encourage vendor participation, the details of which vendors gave particular results were not revealed.
The Risk Assessment Task
The task facing vendors involved several elements: First, Inputs; Most critical was the test portfolio describing positions in various asset classes, including Government Bonds, construct, based on accepted practice. Assumptions also differ from errors; in this paper, the term is limited to describing inconsistencies between assumptions within the same model or system. 
Research Issues
Gaining the cooperation of the vendors was a major challenge. Some vendors were busy with software releases, others reluctant to commit to a project that might reveal awkward discrepancies. One vendor reasoned that VaR was such a relatively small part of their system's total functionality, that any cross-tool survey based on VaR could not do them justice. In the light of these challenges, one of the more impressive aspects of the study, is that we obtained as extensive cooperation as we did-securing the involvement of a large proportion of the major risk management systems vendors. Nevertheless the size of 10 Vendors were informed of the median and the standard deviation of the sample of VaR results by asset class. We also drew the vendor's attention to outliers. 
PRE-EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Structural Analysis Of The Portfolio
One of the easiest ways to understand derivative instruments, is in terms of basic building blocks, such as money markets, forwards, and options (Smith 1993; Smithson 1987) .
Different instrument classes in the test portfolio are also structurally related, providing clues as to the source of the additional variance in the risk assessment caused as new building blocks are pieced together to form more complex instruments. 
Vendor Expectations
We also asked that vendors 16 express the degree of difficulty they had in evaluating the VaR of a particular asset class (1 -Low Effort though 7-High Effort). number of cash flows, such as money markets and FX forwards, and to some extent, FRAs. We hypothesized that the perceived difficulty of VaR estimation for an asset class would be positively related to the variance in the VaR estimates for that asset class.
RESULTS
Going from those asset classes least susceptible to Systems Risk to those most susceptible, we describe vendors' estimates of VaR. Then, we make use of the extensive feedback from the vendors, to suggest likely drivers for any variance in the results despite the obvious limitations imposed upon us by a small sample size. The first thing to note is the similarity of all the parametric results for FX forwards.
There are no major outliers. This suggests the ease with which firms can map forward payments in different currencies to spot plus forward payments of the domestic currency. This was also confirmed by the ease with which users described the task (Weston and Cooper 1996) . 18 Interestingly, it also suggests that the VaR estimation for FX forwards is relatively insensitive to valuation differences.
entirely the result of differences in valuations. We can conclude that for FX forwards, more than for any other asset class in the test portfolio, RiskMetrics™ VaR becomes an highly effective standard with strictly limited systems risk. Money markets thus involved a small but significant systems risk, greater than that for forwards, but less than all other asset classes. Hence, Systems Risk appears greater for FRAs than for forwards and money markets but less than that for bonds and swaps. The Swap results present a major contrast with those of the bonds. For swaps there is much greater variation in the VaR estimates, i.e., Systems risk appears to be greater for swaps than it was for bonds. Systems A and G are outliers, but their removal from the sample does not eliminate the relative standard deviation which decreases to about 8°/0.
Money Market Deposits
Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs)
G's estimates are based on their assumption that all the fixed legs and all the floating legs of the swap should contribute to the interest rate risk component of the swap, whereas other vendors assumed that all the fixed legs but only the first floating leg should contribute to interest rate risk. All the vendors had widely different allocations to FX risk. We believe that this was due to differences in valuation, as spot FX risk is a direct function of the instruments net present value. Several vendors believed the VaR of the swap was especially (i.e. more than the other linear instruments) sensitive to the swap's valuation.
The following table shows the vendors' valuations: Here we see much greater variance in the valuations of swaps than were seen in the bond valuations, but a similar variance in the VaR estimates. This suggests that while estimation of VaR for swaps is similarly difficult to VaR estimation of bonds, swap valuation poses greater difficulties. In both swaps and bonds, it appears that about half the variance in VaR estimates is the result of variance in the valuations. To summarize, the choice of whether to map one or multiple floating legs contributes most to variance in the swap VaR, with much of the remaining variance driven by discrepancies in the valuations. Presumably, like bonds, some swaps' large number of cash flows means that mapping differences may also responsible for some additional variance. The second observation from the results is that the non-parametric results varied more widely than the parametric results, suggesting that model risk is greater than system risk for this asset class. All of the three parametric estimates were very close in their interest rate risks. Two of the three were close in the FX risks and total DEaR. Neither we, nor vendor G, know why G's results were so different. There was also extensive model variation. For interest rate options, most of the discrepancies seem to be due to the choice of model, followed by variation in the valuation of the portfolio. Repeatedly, vendors were dubious about the effectiveness of parametric methods for interest rate options because of the significance of their non-delta risks. The added complexity of the interest rate options is also seen in their use of additional models of interest rate term structure. Combining these models itself increases the complexity and increases the likelihood of user and implementation error. Despite the very small number of data points, but consistent with these concerns, interest rate options appear to have the highest model and systems risk of all the instruments considered in this test portfolio. Variation in valuations appears responsible for a smaller part of the variation in VaR than it was for FX options. This suggests that the risk assessment of interest rate options is more complex than that of FX options even though the valuation appears easier. To summarize, model and systems risks were more similar for interest rate options, and generally larger than for any other asset class in the portfolio. Valuation is less obviously a driver of variance in VaR than it was for FX options.
Comparative Analysis of Aggregate Tool Results
The vendors also produced assessments of VaR for the complete portfolio using RiskMetrics™ Parametric techniques. In our portfolio, we asked that vendors assume complete diversification of risks both across, and within, different asset classes. These 
Corroboration of Researcher Expectations
The expectations of the researchers discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 with one exception were corroborated in the results: Obviously with such small samples, there is also a large confidence interval around these estimates of variance. This error also prevents us from definitively expecting the structural relation being reflected in the variance of the estimates, nevertheless, the results are suggestive.
Corroboration Of Vendor Expectations
We 
CONCLUSIONS
The extent to which different vendors produced similar estimates was closely tied to the nature of the instrument. 21 The importance of systems risks for each asset class is shown graphically and in tabular form below: Finally, our results suggest that Systems Risk should be an important concern of any user of a Value at Risk model. We found wide variation in VaR results produced even using the same model, and variation that was related to increasing complexity of asset class. We note the extreme sensitivity of the results on the detailed assumptions embedded in the models and the systems by highly skilled professionals. This is all too often forgotten by firms' senior management who may assume that formal models (such as that provided by J.P. Morgan's RiskMetrics™) specifies algorithms, and therefore results completely.
FUTURE RESEARCH
While this study provides research methods and a framework for understanding Model and System Risk, we believe the most effective way to estimate the Systems and Model
Risk is through a large-scale regulator-mandated survey of Risk/Valuation models and their implementations. The Bank of England survey (Weston and Cooper 1996) is an early attempt to do for banks' internal valuation models. Rissin from TrueRisk, and Eric Reichenberg at Wall Street Systems.
